Los valores humanos, la economía civil y el bienestar subjetivo

Leonardo Becchetti, Luigino Bruni, Stefano Zamagni


En la raíz de los límites actuales a la fertilidad socioeconómica encontramos tres formas de reduccionismos: Antropológico, Corporativo y el reduccionismo Valor.El objetivo final del programa de investigación de la economía civil es el de hacer frente a estas tres formas de reduccionismo mediante la documentación teórica y empírica. En el presente trabajo se explica por qué el paradigma de la economía civil ya está trabajando para mejorar el actual entorno socioeconómico. En la segunda sección ilustramos las ricas raíces históricas y filosóficas de la economía civil. En la tercera se discute desde un punto de vista teórico por qué la perspectiva reduccionista actual puede ser perjudicial tanto en términos económicos y humanos. En la cuarta se introduce el concepto fundamental de bienes relacionales. En la quinta proporcionamos una amplia evidencia empírica desafiando el paradigma reduccionista y documentando que las dos manos adicionales de ciudadanos y empresas responsables ya están
trabajando. En la sexta aportamos pruebas sobre el nexo entre los valores humanos y cívicos y la prosperidad económica. Por último, la séptima concluye el paper con algunas sugerencias de políticas.

Palabras clave

Bienestar subjetivo; Economía Civil; valores humanos; bienes relacionales

Texto completo:



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